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Criminal Law in Virtual Worldst
Orin S. Kerrt
In the 1990s, the notion of "cyberspace" as a virtual world
captivated internet users and scholars alike.1 The metaphor was
attractive in part because accessing the internet really did feel
like entering a new world. In those days, internet users con-
nected their modems to phone jacks, dialed access numbers, and
waited for the familiar beeps and white noise to bring them up
the ramp from the physical world to the information superhigh-
way.
In the last decade, the virtual metaphor of cyberspace has
seemed increasingly outdated. Today the internet is everywhere.
It is integrated into the physical world through wireless net-
works, BlackBerries, and cell phones. Most internet users no
longer think of spending time in "cyberspace." Instead, the inter-
net comes to them. Connectivity is the norm, and most users ex-
perience using the internet as a connection to services rather
than entrance into cyberspace.
The major exception to this trend has been the increasingly
popular computer programs known as "virtual worlds," such as
the now-popular Second Life. 2 These programs have millions of
regular players and, for many players, have managed to make
the promise of cyberspace a reality. 3 The popularity of virtual
worlds has convinced some scholars that they are the next big
thing: we better be ready to deal with law in virtual worlds,
t Copyright C 2008 Orin Kerr
t Professor, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to Greg Lastowka,
Chris Yoo, Anthony Rickey, Justin Serafini, and the participants in the University of
Chicago Legal Forum symposium for thoughtful comments.
1 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1403,
1403-06 (1996) (discussing how to think about the relationship between virtual worlds
and the actual world at a time when "our understanding of what [cyberspace] will become
is just beginning").
2 See <http://secondlife.com> (last visited Mar 31, 2008).
3 Paul R. La Monica, Life beyond Second Life, available at <http://money.cnn.com/
2007/06/14/news/companies/virtualworlds/index.htm> (last visited Mar 31, 2008) (discuss-
ing the "growing popularity of Second Life and other online worlds').
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the thinking goes, because it will soon be tremendously impor-
tant to millions of Americans. I'm not sure this is true, but if it
is, it raises a very interesting (and even fun) legal question: 4 If
virtual worlds continue to grow, and they do eventually seem like
a true "virtual world" instead of a mere game, how will the law
apply in virtual worlds?
This Article will focus on one aspect of the law of virtual
worlds that has received only modest attention: criminal law in
virtual worlds. 5 It considers two questions. The first is descrip-
tive: When does conduct by an online player in a virtual world
game trigger liability for a real-world crime? The second question
is normative: In the future, will new criminal laws be needed to
account for new social harms that occur in virtual worlds?
Part I of the Article argues that existing laws regulate vir-
tual worlds with little or no regard to the virtual reality they fos-
ter. Criminal law tends to follow the physical rather than the
virtual: it looks to what a person does rather than what the vic-
tim virtually perceives. This dynamic greatly narrows the role of
criminal law in virtual worlds. Existing law will not recognize
virtual murder, virtual threats, or virtual theft. While these "of-
fenses" may appear to users as the cyber-version of traditional
crimes, existing law requires proof of physical elements rather
than virtual analogies. With a few exceptions-and the notable
uncertainty of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 6-
this physical perspective leaves criminal law mostly on the side-
lines in virtual worlds. Virtual worlds will be regulated like any
other game, but their "virtualness" normally will have no inde-
pendent legal resonance from the standpoint of criminal law.
Part II turns to the normative question: Are new laws
needed? It concludes that legislatures should not enact new
criminal laws to account for the new social harms that may occur
in virtual worlds. Virtual worlds at bottom are computer games, 7
4 See, for example, Jack Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom To Design And Freedom
To Play In Virtual Worlds, 90 Va L Rev 2043, 2045 (2004) ("Precisely because virtual
worlds are fast becoming important parts of people's lives, and because they are likely to
be used for more and more purposes in the future, legal regulation of virtual worlds is
inevitable.").
5 The primary scholarly work that focuses on this question is Dan Hunter and Greg
Lastowka, Virtual Crimes, 49 NY L Sch L Rev 293, 294 (2004-05) (exploring the issue of
whether "non-consensual appropriation and destruction of virtual properties ... might be
seen as truly criminal"). As this Article was going to print, I learned of a still-forthcoming
article that also addresses this topic. Bart J.V. Keupink, Virtual Criminal Law in Bound-
less New Environments, 6 Intl J Tech Transfer and Commercialisation 160 (2007).
6 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 USC § 1030 (2000 & Supp 2002).
7 I use the word "game" in a broad sense to refer to entertainment environments
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and games are artificial structures better regulated by game ad-
ministrators than federal or state governments. The best pun-
ishment for a violation of a game comes from the game itself.
This does not mean that online virtual worlds are unimportant.
To the contrary, games can be enormously important to an indi-
vidual's identity. As any sports aficionado knows, a game can be
a source of tremendous pride, happiness, and (especially for Mets
fans) disappointment. But criminal law does not regulate all im-
portant things. Criminal law is a blunt instrument that should
be used only as a last resort. The state's power to deny individu-
als their freedom is an extraordinary power, and it should be re-
served for harms that other mechanisms cannot remedy.
Online virtual worlds may seem real to some users, but
unlike real life, they are mediated by game administrators who
can take action with consequences internal to the game. Internal
virtual harms should trigger internal virtual remedies. It is only
when harms extend outside the game that the criminal law
should be potentially available to remedy wrongs not redressable
elsewhere.
I. How DOES CRIMINAL LAW REGULATE CONDUCT IN VIRTUAL
WORLDS?
The tension between virtual and physical perspectives is a
recurring theme in the law of the internet.8 Network transac-
tions can be modeled in two ways: virtually and physically. The
virtual approach looks at the virtual facts experienced by a user.
Modeling internet transactions from a virtual perspective inter-
prets the facts of the internet from the perspective of an internet
user.9 From this perspective, a user enters a virtual world. He
might visit stores to make purchases, enter a virtual chat room
to speak to other users, or go to virtual concerts to hear music.
The physical perspective is different. Modeling internet
transactions from a physical perspective focuses on what actually
rather than in a narrow sense to refer to competitive games. Many virtual worlds do not
provide users with a specific purpose such as acquiring property or points. In my view,
however, they still count as games. For the distinction between virtual worlds that are
more or less structured and game-like, see Bryan T. Camp, The Play's The Thing: A The-
ory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 Hastings L J 1, 4-8 (2007).
8 Consider Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 Georgetown
L J 357 (2003) (discussing the choice between virtual and physical approaches to applying
law to the internet).
9 Id at 359-60 (describing an "internal perspective" as one that accepts as reality
those things the participants in a virtual world perceive to be happening).
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happens rather than what a user perceives. ' 0 From this perspec-
tive, a user doesn't enter a virtual world. Rather, he logs on to a
server located somewhere in the world and then sends and re-
ceives electronic communications. The focus stays on what actu-
ally occurs via the physical network, rather than on virtual
analogies based on user perceptions.
The distinction between virtual and physical approaches is
critical to understanding how criminal law applies to virtual
worlds. Criminal laws traditionally focus on the physical per-
spective rather than the virtual one. Criminal laws prohibit
committing a series of elements, and those elements must be
construed strictly. 1" Whether a person has violated a particular
crime hinges on whether the elements have been satisfied. The
elements of crimes tend to be physical: they require physical
acts, communications between physical places, and impact on
real physical people. For example, the crime of homicide prohib-
its causing the death of a person, not an avatar.12 The crime of
trespass requires physical entrance of a person into a space
rather than some kind of virtual entry. 13
The fact that traditional crimes generally follow a physical
perspective means that the virtual meaning of conduct in online
games is irrelevant for most criminal laws. What matters is what
actually happens from a physical perspective instead of what a
virtual world user perceives. Traditional crimes committed using
the intermediary of virtual worlds will still be crimes; money
laundering via a virtual world economy is still money laundering.
But misconduct that draws social significance from its meaning
in virtual reality normally will have no resonance with criminal
statutes. Virtual rape is not rape, as there is no actual person
who is physically violated. It is a story (or an image) of a rape
and no more. 14 Although an act may seem like the "cyber"
10 Id at 360 (describing an "external perspective" as one that takes as reality the
actual interactions with a computer and a network).
11 Under the rule of lenity, "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity." Rewis v United States, 401 US 808, 812 (1971).
12 See, for example, Model Penal Code § 210.1. An avatar is "an electronic image that
represents and is manipulated by a computer user." See Merriam-Webster Online Dic-
tionary, available at <http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/avatar> (last visited Mar 31, 2008).
13 Charles Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 331 at 202 (14th ed 1980) (noting that
"part of the defendant's person pass[ing the line of the threshold" is ordinarily required
under criminal trespass laws).
14 See Kerr, 91 Georgetown L J at 372 n 66 (cited in note 8) (describing a situation in
a virtual game where one user manipulated the game so that his virtual character raped
other characters within the game).
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equivalent of a crime, the law focuses on real physical elements
rather than virtual analogues.
Consider the federal crime of sending a threat in interstate
commerce. 15 The statute requires sending a threat that actually
crosses state lines; whether a user might perceive the threat as
"interstate" in nature is irrelevant. A young man named Mat-
thew Kammersell learned this lesson when he sent a threatening
AOL instant message ("IM") to his girlfriend a few miles away. 16
Although both he and his girlfriend were in Utah, the fact that
the IM was routed through AOL's servers in Virginia made the
threat an interstate threat. 17 What mattered was the communi-
cation's physical path, not Kammersell's perception.
The key implication of the physical perspective is that most
misconduct internal to virtual worlds will not count as criminal
activity under physical criminal laws. For example, imagine one
avatar "steals" valuable data from another avatar. Is this theft?
A user might think so, but the law ordinarily won't support that
perception. The reason is that the "virtual theft" will often be
perceived as part of the rules of the game. At bottom, virtual
worlds are games; individuals agree to play them, whether for
fun or profit, just like other games. And like other games, virtual
world games have artificial rules about what players can or can-
not do.' 8 Therefore, if what appears to be "theft" from a virtual
perspective is actually a permitted move under the rules of that
game, it is not any kind of theft from the physical perspective of
the criminal law. As Dan Hunter and Greg Lastowka note, "[t]he
norms of game play supersede the standard rules of society." 19
A string of century-old card game cases from Texas illustrate
the point.20 In these cases, individuals lost money in card games
15 18 USC § 875(c) (2000) (prohibiting anyone from "transmit[ting] in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any
threat to injure the person of another").
16 See United States v Kammersell, 196 F3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir 1999) (holding that
an instant message sent from Utah to Virginia and back to Utah is an interstate commu-
nication, even though no one outside of Utah saw or could have seen the message).
17 Id ("A threat that was unquestionably transmitted over interstate telephone lines
falls within the literal scope of the statute and gives rise to federal jurisdiction.").
18 For an example of such a set of rules, see Second Life's Community Standards,
available at <http://secondlife.com/app/help/rules/cs.php> (last visited Mar 31, 2008)
(prohibiting things such "shooting, pushing, or shoving ... in a Safe Area," and entitling
users "to a reasonable level of privacy with regard to their Second Lives").
19 Hunter and Las owka, Virtual Crimes at 305 (cited in note 5).
20 Hernandez v State, 63 SW 320 (Tex Crim App 1901) (plaintiff alleged theft after
players would not return his bets, though he claimed he was framed as a cheater in a
card game); Palmer v State, 160 SW 349 (Tex Crim App 1913) (defendant accused of rob-
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and tried to keep the money they had lost, either because they
thought the game was rigged or because they claimed to have
been cheated. 21 When charged with robbery or theft, they argued
that the money belonged to them and therefore they had commit-
ted no crime. 22 The key point for our purposes is that the courts
always deferred to the announced rules of the game to determine
who owned what. 23 According to the courts, title did not pass
when the prior owner put his money into the common pot: at that
point the owner "merely parted with the temporary possession,
undertaking to win the 'pot' fairly in accordance with the rules of
the game." 24 On the other hand, title passed when a player
played his hand and simply lost under the established rules: "If,
under the rules of the game they were playing, the [victim] had
won the money, and it had passed into his hands under the rules
of the game," then ownership in the money passed from the loser
to the winner. 25 The rules of the game governed.
Where is the line of criminality if the rules of the game
trump? Any kind of cheating should suffice. For example, in one
Texas case a man named Dorsey dealt a hand in a card game
that required 40 cards. 26 Dorsey told Temple that there were 40
cards in the deck, and Temple agreed to play based on Dorsey's
representation. 27 Temple began to lose, and he suspected that
Dorsey was cheating and that the deck had 36 cards instead of
40.28 Temple grabbed the money he had lost and ran out.2 9 Tem-
ple eventually was caught and charged with robbery, and he
sought and was refused a jury instruction on his view that Dor-
bery after taking money back from a gambling table where he claims he was cheated);
Temple v State, 215 SW 965 (Tex Crim App 1919) (appellant charged with theft after
taking his money back from a card game where the deck was rigged).
21 See, for example, Temple, 215 SW at 965 ("Appellant's theory was that Dorsey,
who was dealing, represented to him that there were 40 cards in the deck, and that he
believed that to be true, when, as a matter of fact it was false, Dorsey having but 36 cards
in the deck.").
22 Id ("appellant ... presents here the view that, if the appellant was induced to part
with his money and place it under the control of Dorsey through his deception and fraud,
he would not be guilty of the offense of robbery in regaining possession of it").
23 See, for example, Palmer, 160 SW at 352 ("If, under the rules of the game they
were playing, the banker had won the money, and it had passed into his hands under the
rules of the game, and appellant had subsequently taken the money by force or violence, a
case of robbery would be complete.").
24 Hernandez, 63 SW at 321.
25 Palmer, 160 SW at 352.
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sey had cheated him. 30 The Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that, if Dorsey had used 36 cards instead of 40, taking the money
from Dorsey was not a crime. 31 If Temple's facts were correct, the
court concluded, "he was induced to part with his money, not per-
force of any game played according to its rules, but by reason of
the false and fraudulent representations of Dorsey."32
Yet if the rules of the game trump, this raises the important
question of what "the rules of the game" in a virtual world actu-
ally are. The rules of card games ordinarily are clear. The choices
remain narrow and bounded. Each player has a set of cards, and
clear rules govern when a player can add or subtract cards. In
contrast, virtual worlds are open. In a practical sense, a user has
an infinite number of moves he can make. Which moves are per-
mitted and which are not may be difficult to know. In this set-
ting, how should courts determine "the rules?"
Similar issues have arisen occasionally in the context of
sporting events. Consider an example from a professional hockey
game. In February 2000, Marty McSorley of the Boston Bruins
used his hockey stick to hit Vancouver Canucks player Donald
Brashear in the head.33 Brashear fell and suffered a concussion
and later experienced memory loss from the incident. 34 McSorley
was charged in court in British Columbia with assault on the
theory that his hitting Brashear was beyond the rules of the
game. 35 The trial judge agreed, finding that McSorley's conduct
was beyond the violence that is a part of the game of professional
hockey. 36 The judge relied on a Canadian Supreme Court ruling
arising from a brawl which held that people cannot consent to
serious harm being inflicted upon them, even if they have con-
sented to some physical contact, 37 Applying that reasoning to
30 Temple, 215 SW at 966.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Tom Spousta, McSorley Found Guilty; No Jail Time, New York Times D7 (Oct 7,
2000).
34 Gregg Joyce, McSorley Guilty of Assault, But Gets Conditional Discharge, The
Record A01 (October 7, 2000).
35 Ron Jouard, McSorley Found Guilty of Assault with Weapon, (Oct 17, 2000), avail-
able at <http://www.defencelaw.com/hockey-assault.html> (last visited Mar 31, 2008).
36 Id ("The court found McSorley guilty of assault with a weapon, observing, 'Every
time a player uses a stick to apply force to another player, the stick is being used as a
weapon and not to direct the puck as it was intended to do."').
37 Jouard, McSorley Found Guilty of Assault with Weapon (cited in note 35) ("the
victim's consent to a fair fight did not preclude commission of the offence of assault"),
citing R v Jobidon, 2 SCR 714, 715 ("the scale tips heavily against the validity of a per-
son's consents to the infliction of bodily injury in a fight").
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McSorley's attack on Brashear, the judge held that McSorley's
conduct was beyond the game because McSorley had targeted
Brashear's head.38 It would have been a different case if McSor-
ley had aimed for Brashear's shoulder: "[I]f the slash was in-
tended for the shoulder, delivered with the intention of starting a
fight," the judge wrote, "my conclusion would be that it was
within the common practices and norms of the game" and there-
fore not an assault.39
How might courts determine the "common practices and
norms" of virtual worlds? One possibility is that courts will rec-
ognize Terms of Service ("ToS") and End-User License Agree-
ments ("EULAs") as controlling, at least when they are clear. The
rules of the game will become whatever the game °company says
they are, much like the rules of a poker game are announced by
the house. Courts could assume that anything permitted by code
that is not forbidden by the EULAs or ToS is part of the game.
Alternatively, courts might try to rely on widely accepted norms
of usage among gainers to determine those rules.40 That is,
courts could look to how particular games are normally played,
much like the McSorley judge looked to social understandings of
hockey to rule his conduct out of bounds.
Although these standards will often lead courts to have a
hands-off approach to virtual misconduct, I want to make clear
that it is only the "virtualness" of the misconduct that is at issue
here. Misconduct that goes beyond the virtual world will trigger
criminal liability just as it would in the real world. A recent ar-
rest in Holland provides a helpful illustration. According to news
reports, a teenager created fake websites that tricked users into
believing that it was a login page for a virtual world game called
Habbo Hotel. 41 Users disclosed their user names and passwords
to the fake website, and the teenager allegedly logged onto the
users' accounts and gave away their virtual furniture to him and
his friends. 42 Within the Habbo Hotel virtual environment, vir-
tual furniture could only be purchased with real money and
38 Jouard, McSorley Found Guilty of Assault with Weapon (cited in note 35) ("[Play-
ers] cannot validly consent to serious violence that clearly extends beyond the ordinary
norms of conduct.").
39 Id.
40 See, for example, Buster Olney, Sports of the Times: It's Time for Players To Police
Themselves, New York Times D5 (June 3, 2002)
41 Virtual Theft Leads to Arrest, Nov 14, 2007, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hiltechnology/7094764.stm> (last visited, Mar 31, 2008).
42 Id.
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could not be "stolen" by other users: the sum of all the furniture
that the teenager moved was apparently purchased for thou-
sands of dollars. 43 This conduct properly led to criminal charges
because it was an actual theft, not a virtual representation of
one. 44 The game itself did not let users transfer property. Rather,
the unauthorized use of a password let the teenager access other
users' accounts and drain the account of valuable items. 45 This is
a traditional theft, closely analogous to often-prosecuted thefts
involving unauthorized use of credit cards and ATM cards.46
I will end this part of the Article by mentioning the usual
wildcard in any discussion of computer crime law: the federal
unauthorized access statute, often referred to as the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"). 47 As I have detailed elsewhere, 48
this statute has become the law that threatens to swallow the
internet. Precedents on the books in the civil context suggest
that it could be applied remarkably expansively to prohibit a
very wide range of conduct on the criminal side.49 The First Cir-
cuit's decision in EF Cultural Travel BV v Explorica50 demon-
strates the problem. In that case, the court adopted a contractual
view of Congress's prohibition on "exceed[ing] authorized access"
to a computer. 51 Violating a contractual term to access a website
triggered the criminal law. 52
If adopted widely, this notion would mean that almost all
user conduct that violates the ToS or EULA would also trigger
felony criminal liability under the CFAA, subject, perhaps, to a
43 Id.
44 Id ("It is a theft because the furniture is paid for with real money.").
45 Virtual Theft Leads to Arrest (cited in note 41) ("[T'he only way to be a thief in
Habbo is to get people's usernames and passwords and then log in and take the furni-
ture.").
46 Consider People v Whight, 43 Cal Rptr 2d 163 (Cal App 1995) (concluding that
intentional use of an ATM to withdraw funds from empty account due to error in process-
ing services amounts to theft by false pretenses).
47 18 USC § 1030 (2000 & Supp 2002).
48 Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 NYU L Rev 1596 (2003).
49 Id at 1598 ("[Ulnauthorized access statutes broadly criminalize the law of contract
involving the use of computers.").
50 274 F3d 577 (1st Cir 2003).
51 Id at 582 (affirming the district court's conclusion that appellees will likely succeed
on the merits of their CFAA claim based on an analysis of the confidentiality agreement
between the parties).
52 This theory of contract-based criminal liability, with analysis of EF Cultural
Travel BV v Explorica Inc, is explored in depth in Orin S. Kerr, Computer Crime Law ch 2
at 54-64 (Thomson/West 2006) (section analyzing contract-based restrictions in consider-
ing what constitutes authorization).
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"public policy" exception that might not pay attention to some
conditions in such contracts.5 3 Unsurprisingly, several legal dis-
putes involving virtual worlds have raised CFAA claims, al-
though so far none have been resolved by the courts. 54
The implications of this theory on criminal law in virtual
worlds would be profound. At the same time, they seem to be no
more profound here than in any other context online. If section
1030 becomes the statute that swallows the internet, the fact
that it will swallow virtual worlds along with the rest of the
internet says nothing in particular about virtual worlds. As a
result, this review of how current criminal law regulates virtual
worlds need only end with a caveat: the answer depends heavily
on the unsettled scope of 18 USC § 1030.
II. How SHOULD CRIMINAL LAW APPLY TO CONDUCT IN VIRTUAL
WORLDS IN THE FUTURE?
Let's turn from the descriptive question to the normative
one. Are new criminal laws needed to account for the new social
harms that occur in virtual worlds? At first blush, this may seem
like a strange question. Virtual worlds are in their relative in-
fancy. In the United States, they remain largely the domain of
computer geeks,5 5 and most look more like bad cartoons than
anything approaching "reality." As a result, imagining new
criminal laws for virtual worlds may seem fanciful at best. But
imagine a future in which this no longer remains true. Imagine a
virtual reality of virtual worlds that appear quite real-worlds
that look, feel, and sound pretty much like the real thing. If such
a future comes to pass, will new criminal laws be needed to regu-
late virtual harms in virtual worlds?
I think the answer is "no." The reason is not that misconduct
in virtual worlds will prove unimportant. If this future comes to
pass, we will presumably value our experiences in virtual worlds
53 The First Circuit hinted at this in a subsequent case, EF Cultural Travel BV v
Zefer Corp, 318 F3d 58, 62 (1st Cir 2003) ("Whether public policy might in turn limit
certain restrictions is a separate issue.").
54 Examples include two lawsuits brought by Blizzard against gold farmers in World
of Warcraft. See Blizzard Entertainment, Inc v In Game Dollar, LLC, No. 07-0589 (C D
Cal 2007); MDY Indus, LLC v Blizzard Entertainmentt, Inc, No 06-2555 (D Ariz 2006). In
addition, Linden Lab (Second Life) raised CFAA arguments in its counterclaim against
Marc Bragg. However, the case was settled, so no court ever addressed the issue. See
Adam Reuters, Linden Lab Settles Bragg Lawsuit, Reuters Second Life News Center (Oct
4, 2007), available at <http://secondlife.reuters.comlstories/2007/10/O4linden-lab-settles-
bragg-lawsuit/> (last visited Apr 2, 2008). Thanks to Greg Lastowka for the examples.
55 I mean that in the most endearing sense.
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much as we do in traditional worlds. Rather, the reason is that
virtual worlds at bottom are computer games, and games are
artificial structures better regulated by game administrators
than governments. Online virtual worlds may someday seem
real, but unlike real life they are mediated by game administra-
tors that can take action with consequences internal to the game.
Game administrators do not merely act like governments in vir-
tual worlds: they act like gods. They can punish users by chang-
ing their virtual environment or even banning them. 56 They can
restore life and hit "reset" to start a user over again from
scratch. 57
Given their power to control whatever happens in online en-
vironments, game administrators should control and regulate
virtual misconduct instead of governments. Traditional govern-
ments can continue to deal with non-virtual harms arising out of
virtual worlds, such as the theft of virtual furniture in Habbo
Hotel. But misconduct arising only in a virtual sense should re-
main the domain of game administrators.
The problem, in part, is that criminal law provides a terribly
blunt and awkward instrument for social control. Criminal law
looks powerful and effective on TV: Episodes of Law & Order are
ubiquitous, and all is well when the bad guy gets locked away.
But substantive criminal laws rarely provide a nuanced response
to social harms. In the real world, the difficulty of investigating
crimes and the personal and societal costs of punishment make
criminal punishment a last recourse rather than the front line of
defense.
This is a particularly serious problem in the case of com-
puter crimes generally, and virtual misconduct specifically. Con-
sider just a few practical problems inherent in the use of criminal
laws to punish online misconduct. First, it must be technically
possible to locate the wrongdoer. A clever suspect who wants to
commit a crime online can take steps to avoid detection and cap-
ture. He can use proxy servers, hacked accounts, and other tricks
to disguise his identity and whereabouts; a clever wrongdoer or-
dinarily will not get caught.
In part, this is a problem for all online investigations: The
government usually catches only the dumb ones. Online, the
56 See, for example, Second Life Terms of Service, available at <http://secondlife.com/
corporate/tos.php> (last visited Mar 31, 2008) ("All aspects of the Service are subject to
change or elimination at Linden Lab's sole discretion.").
57 Id ("All aspects of the Service are subject to change or elimination at Linden Lab's
sole discretion.").
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tools of criminal investigations are cumbersome and inefficient;
user mechanisms for disguising identity are easy. But it's also a
particular problem with virtual harms because depending on the
virtual world's logging software, and the extent of the wrong-
doer's efforts to cover his tracks, there may or may not be an ob-
vious trail of money or contraband for the police to follow. Even if
governments enact new criminal laws that broadly regulate user
conduct in virtual worlds, those laws will have little to no effect if
wrongdoers know that the governments have very little chance of
identifying and capturing them.
Second, government investigators must have jurisdiction to
investigate criminal activity and resources to invest in each indi-
vidual case. It is easy for Congress to draft a broad statute with
wide extraterritorial application, and Congress has generally
done so for computer-related crimes. 58 But this hardly addresses
the bigger problem. Individuals in a virtual world could be any-
where, and extraterritorial evidence collection is quite cumber-
some. A police officer in Los Angeles has little way of helping a
Los Angeles citizen who was injured by someone in Russia
through a server in the Netherlands. Extraterritorial evidence
collection and extradition are both possible, at least in appropri-
ate crimes, but these processes tend to be complex, resource-
intensive, and unreliable. Such procedures work well in high-
profile cases that draw intense government interest, but they
often block investigations into low-level offenses. 59
Imagine that a wrongdoer is identified and captured, and
then is extradited or voluntarily agrees to come to the jurisdic-
tion investigating the offense. What then? The primary remedies
of the criminal law tend to be narrow and specific: fines and jail
time. Jail time would prove an awkward remedy for new virtual
crimes. What new virtual crime could be so severe that it does
not fit into existing law and goes beyond the powers of game ad-
ministrators to remedy-so much that deterrence or retribution
justify putting the virtual wrongdoer in a real-life physical
prison? It is hard to imagine such an offense.
58 See Orin S. Kerr, Computer Crime Law ch 7 at 582-84 (cited in note 52) (discuss-
ing the scope of 18 USC § 1030 under the broadened definition of "protected computer"
found in 18 USC § 1030(e)(2), as amended in 2001).
59 See Panel: Cybercrimes And The Domestication Of International Criminal Law, 5
Santa Clara J Intl L 432, 442 (2007) (statement of Assistant United States Attorney
Elena Duarte) ("For serious cybercrimes, the United States would probably extradite. But
for a lot of the lesser crimes, even felonies, extradition is not a very practical remedy.").
[2008:
CRIMINAL LAW IN VIRTUAL WORLDS
Fines are a better option, but will often provide more of a
theoretical punishment than a real one. Most individuals lack
the financial ability to pay criminal fines. Even wealthy defen-
dants within a court's jurisdiction often will find ways to avoid
payment. In a recent study by the Government Accountability
Office ("GAO"), for example, the GAO studied five criminal cases,
involving convictions five to thirteen years earlier, in which very
wealthy defendants were convicted and ordered to pay fines to-
taling $568 million. 60 All five defendants took steps to hide their
assets, and all five later claimed an inability to pay. The gov-
ernment collected only $40 million from the defendants, about 7
percent of the total ordered. 61 Government officials did not plan
on pursuing additional funds because willful failure to pay a fine
or restitution is not itself a crime. 62
More broadly, a strong regime of criminal enforcement
would threaten one of the foundational strengths of virtual world
games: the ability of each virtual world to define its own terms
and to appeal to specific users who want that virtual environ-
ment instead of another. 63 Each virtual world is unique, and
internet users can pick the ones they enjoy. So long as harms
remain virtual ones, each community can define what virtual
harms deserve protection and which do not. In contrast, criminal
law tends to be one size fits all. The criminal law enacts broad
prohibitions, and those prohibitions apply in the same way to
each subject.
This leaves two unappealing alternatives for how criminal
law can regulate virtual worlds. First, criminal law could force
every virtual world to conform to the same standard. In effect,
the law could impose rules of the game by statute. But this de-
feats the efforts by game administrators and game players alike
to opt for a game with rules to their liking.64 One person's virtual
harm is another's virtual benefit; the state has no legitimate role
in imposing uniformity on such matters of personal taste.65
60 Associated Press, Huge White Collar Fines Go Unpaid (Mar 3, 2005), available at
<http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/7082314/> (last visited Mar 31, 2008).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Balkin, 90 Va L Rev at 2044 (cited in note 4) ('The inhabitants of these virtual
worlds should be given a chance to decide what internal norms will guide them.").
64 This may raise important First Amendment issues. See id at 2053-58 (classifying
design and play in virtual worlds as speech, and discussing other First Amendment is-
sues).
65 See Stanley v Georgia, 394 US 557, 565 (1969) ("[A] State has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.
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Second, the law could punish violations of the rules as de-
fined by the game administrators. For example, a legislature
could criminalize violating ToS that regulate virtual worlds. This
would be "one size fits all" in the sense that it would apply
equally to any ToS. Such a law would effectively delegate the line
of criminality to private individuals, who could define the scope
of criminal law in their virtual world through the ToS. As I have
argued at length elsewhere, this is a dangerous and potentially
unconstitutional idea. 66 ToS are arbitrary, and can reflect the
whims and biases of whoever sets them. As a result, a violation
of ToS often has no correlation to a social harm that merits pun-
ishment or requires deterrence. 67
Because criminal law is a blunt instrument poorly suited to
respond to virtual misconduct, virtual crimes should trigger vir-
tual remedies. Criminal penalties serve as a last resort in the
physical world when misconduct threatens the lives or security of
persons or involves property crimes that civil law cannot ad-
dress. But virtual harms are best dealt with by virtual remedies.
So long as misconduct stays virtual, it should remain the domain
of game administrators well-equipped to redress harms, rather
than governments who have only the crude hammer of criminal
punishment.
III. CONCLUSION
John Perry Barlow famously began his essay A Declaration
of the Independence of Cyberspace with a dramatic call for gov-
ernments to stay away: "Governments of the Industrial World,
you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the
new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past
to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no
sovereignty where we gather."68 As general guidance, Barlow's
call was rather silly, I think. 69 But if we limit Barlow's call to
how criminal law should regulate the "virtualness" of virtual
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power
to control men's minds.').
66 See Kerr, 78 NYU L Rev at 1656-60 (cited in note 48).
67 Id at 1656-58.
68 See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb 8,
1996) available at <http://homes.eff.orgl-barlow/Declaration-Final.html> (last visited
Mar 31, 2008).
69 See, for example, Orin S. Kerr, Enforcing Law Online, 74 U Chi L Rev 745, 751-54
(2007) (reviewing a book that discusses the question of enforceability of law over the
internet).
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worlds, Barlow was exactly right. Criminal law generally should
take a hands-off approach to virtual misconduct; virtual wrongs
should trigger virtual punishments rather than real ones. The
"weary giants of flesh and steel" should mostly leave virtual
worlds alone-not because they are not welcome there, but be-
cause their mechanisms are ill-suited to respond to purely vir-
tual harms. Criminal law is not a game, and governments should
not interfere with virtual worlds that are.
a
